Khatia Dekanoidze: Police Reform in Ukraine: Achievements and Failures           

The Soviet Union established a deeply corrupt and flawed criminal justice system designed to protect itself. Infiltrated by organised crime, it essentially functioned as a criminal body. Following the Soviet collapse, except for the Baltic states, corruption, clan-based structures, nepotism, and human rights violations persisted in the newly independent republics, mirroring the Soviet framework. It was a heritage in Ukraine too.

Ukraine’s law enforcement system, particularly before the Revolution of Dignity and during the early post-Soviet period, was deeply corrupt, inheriting many flaws from the Soviet system. The following characteristics and factors contributed to its systemic corruption:

Elite and Petty Corruption: Corruption permeated all levels of law enforcement. High-ranking officials engaged in elite corruption, such as embezzlement of state resources or protecting powerful criminal networks for personal gain. Meanwhile, petty corruption was rampant among lower-level officers, who frequently demanded bribes from citizens for routine services like traffic stops, permits, or avoiding minor penalties.

Infiltration by Organized Crime: The system was heavily infiltrated by organized crime, facilitated by corruption. Criminal groups often bribed or collaborated with police, prosecutors, and judges, creating networks that protected illegal activities like drug trafficking, extortion, and smuggling. This blurred the line between law enforcement and criminal enterprises.

Clan-Based Networks and Cronyism: Law enforcement operated through clan-like structures, where loyalty to personal networks trumped professional duty. Police chiefs, prosecutors, and judges often shared economic interests, forming tight-knit groups that prioritized mutual benefit over justice. Nepotism ensured that positions were filled based on connections rather than merit.

Soviet-Style Bureaucracy and Centralization: The system inherited a rigid, centralized structure from the Soviet era, with the Ministry of Internal Affairs holding near-absolute control. This monopolized power, concentrated in the hands of politically appointed figures, made the system prone to abuse and reduced accountability. Decentralization or independent oversight was virtually non-existent.

Low Salaries and Poor Infrastructure:  Officers were underpaid. It made them susceptible to bribery as a means of supplementing income. Inadequate funding also led to outdated equipment, poor training facilities, and dilapidated infrastructure, further demoralizing the force and fostering a culture of corruption to compensate for resource shortages.

Soviet Rudimentary Education and Training: Training for law enforcement was outdated, rooted in Soviet-era practices that emphasized control over service. Officers were often ill-equipped to handle modern policing challenges, relying on intimidation or corrupt practices rather than professional skills.

Lack of Public Trust: Systemic corruption eroded public confidence, as citizens viewed police as predatory rather than protective. This lack of trust discouraged cooperation with law enforcement, perpetuating a cycle where police relied on coercion or bribes to maintain authority.

For years, Ukrainian Society had been demanding fair, human-centered, and transparent law enforcement institutions, but these requests went largely unfulfilled, leaving anachronism, cronyism, and systemic corruption entrenched. Ukrainians saw the police forces as their primary function – to serve as the state’s primary security guardians, tasked with protecting people and property through public assistance, law enforcement, crime identification, investigation, prevention, and maintaining peaceful public order. As the frontline of state security, they are the most visible institution that citizens encounter daily.

The 2005-2012 Georgia’s police reforms set a tone for some other neighbouring countries. It was remarkably successful and widely recognized. By eradicating corruption, organized crime (largely known as ‘thieves-in-Law’ mafia style soviet tradition), nepotism, and clan-based structures, Georgia laid a foundation for progress and the rule of law. In fact, many post-Soviet republics sought to emulate this model, but the absence of political will often hindered their efforts, diluting the commitment and spirit needed for meaningful reform.

Following Ukraine’s Dignity Revolution, reforming law enforcement became essential not only for societal trust but also for the country’s development. It was vital to fill the abyss of the Ukrainian public’s lack of confidence in the state Institutions, undermining feelings of safety, protection of businesses and private property, child safety, and adherence to human rights standards. Without the rule of law, a democratic society cannot exist, nor can it thrive without safeguarding human and property rights — core responsibilities of state institutions, particularly the police. Inspired by Georgia’s success, President Poroshenko’s government sought to replicate these reforms post-revolution. Police reform became a pathway to establishing the rule of law, gaining Euro-Atlantic support, and securing political backing. The Government understood that without law enforcement and anticorruption reforms, it would be difficult to acquire Western support and technical assistance.

The task required a near-complete overhaul of the law enforcement system, focusing on eliminating corruption, reducing crime, combating organized crime, earning public trust, protecting human and property rights, and maintaining public order. Achieving these goals was possible but depended heavily on the state and political leaders’ commitment, expressed through political will? It is not a specific law or individual but a unified government approach ensuring impartial law enforcement and punishment, simplified regulations, reduced bureaucracy, and efficient service delivery to citizens. Political will is essential to declare corruption as a common enemy and prioritize transparent institutions to expose hidden financial flows. It was important for Ukraine’s law enforcement, which was plagued by elite and petty corruption, infiltration by organized crime, bureaucratic inefficiencies, Soviet-style rudimentary education, clan-based networks linking prosecutors, judges, and police chiefs through shared economic interests, low salaries, and poor infrastructure.

In 2012, Georgia’s elections saw pro-Russian oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili defeat reformist, pro-Western Mikheil Saakashvili. Legal cases were launched against Saakashvili and his allies. As a reform expert, Saakashvili was invited to Ukraine, catalysing the import of Georgia’s police reform model. The Soviet-inherited, highly centralized, and monopolized police system, controlled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, lacked decentralization or checks and balances.  In Ukraine, this was exemplified by the powerful Interior Minister Arsen Avakov, whose political influence overshadowed institutional autonomy. President Poroshenko and Minister Avakov were “kind” enemies. Nowadays, I can admit that the Minister of Internal Affairs, with its enormous forces, was more influential than the President of Ukraine. At least, he used his power effectively. Police forces typically included traffic police, the first responders to crime, criminal police for investigation and operations, special forces, and crowd control units. But the Minister was more powerful than a police chief; he obtained an institutional control over the National Guard. The new National Guard absorbed the Interior Ministry’s ‘Internal Troops’ and volunteer battalions. The National Guard functioned as a territorial defence and support to the Armed Forces during wartime, civilian law enforcement: guarding government buildings, managing protests, and protecting critical infrastructure and forces during civilian unrest. Possessing control over the National Guard was one of the issues of controversy between the President and the Minister from different political groups.

The first wave of reform targeted the patrol police, abolishing the corrupt Soviet-era traffic police and establishing a modern, prevention-focused patrol police department.

Key factors included:

• a transparent recruitment system with rigorous vetting;
• modern tactical and intellectual training;
• geographic redistribution for patrolling;
• new uniforms and equipment;
• decent salaries and social benefits.

The appointment of Eka Zguladze as Avakov’s deputy kickstarted the patrol police reform, supported significantly by the U.S. ICITAP (International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, a specialized initiative of the U.S. Department of Justice. Since its founding in 1986, ICITAP has played a pivotal role in helping foreign governments build professional, transparent, and rights-respecting law enforcement institutions.) program, which focused on recruitment.

The process involved vacancy announcements, strict criteria, general and psychological testing, physical assessments, and competitive salaries with social benefits. During the recruitment of patrol officers, candidates underwent specialized psychological testing, which constituted a critical element of the selection process. These assessments were designed to evaluate emotional resilience, ethical judgment, and the capacity to perform under pressure – qualities essential for building public trust and ensuring professional conduct in law enforcement. The integration of psychological screening marked a departure from previous practices and reflected a broader commitment to institutional reform and modernization.

Ultimately, the patrol police reform succeeded, mobilising nearly 15,000 new recruits. Training occurred at the Interior Ministry’s academy, not as higher education but as intensive, U.S.-style courses lasting a few months, with tactics developed by American police experts. Within six months, Kyiv’s patrol police department was operational. The emphasis on young, patriotic officers was key, as reforming the old, corrupt system was deemed impossible.

In December 2015, Ukraine’s National Police was established—a legislative step forward, though insufficient. The law didn’t grant the National Police chief enough independence from the politically appointed Interior Minister. Despite debates in the Verkhovna Rada, the law was a compromise, leaving the Interior Ministry dominant and the police with limited autonomy. After the patrol police’s success, the focus shifted to the criminal police, a more resistant and sensitive area due to its entrenched clan-based structures and cronyism.

The public trust in the Patrol Police increased to 60%, but the main challenge remained the vetting (attestation) process of former militia officers. My idea was that without passing attestation, former militia officers should not be allowed to be appointed to the Police staff. The main challenge was a political one. Heads of departments and regional districts had been too influential and tied to the different political figures to be vetted properly. The commissions reviewed approximately seventy thousand former Militia and fired over five thousand, or nine percent of police in 2016.

The Central Commission consists of five members:

• Two representatives appointed by the Minister of Internal Affairs.
• One – nominated by the Chief of Police.
• Two public representatives recommended by the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights – chosen from persons with impeccable reputation, strong professional standards.

As you have seen, the balance in the commissions was in favour of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The same principle was at the different cities where all regional Militia had been vetted. The vetting process was accompanied by a huge scandal. One of the scandals was the firing of a Head Anti-Drug Unit – Ilia Kyva, who later betrayed Ukraine and escaped to Russia. It was a symbol of the broader struggle between reform and entrenched figures from the political clans covered by the Influential Minister. Vetting faced lots of criticism.

The vetting process was met with profound systemic resistance. Former members of the militia organized demonstrations, issued personal insults, and made threats. The persistence of double standards and impunity within the police force could not be overcome without a high degree of independence in the judiciary and the prosecutor’s office. One of the most detrimental outcomes of the vetting process was the legal reinstatement of dismissed officials, which ultimately undermined and halted the reform of the criminal police.

Regional police chiefs could neither be dismissed nor appointed without the direct involvement of the Minister, reflecting the centralised nature of decision-making. Legislative progress was severely hindered due to the absence of political support in the Verkhovna Rada, where reform initiatives lacked both allies and a dedicated parliamentary faction. The reform agenda was overshadowed by significant political interests at play.

A functional internal audit service was never established. The prosecutor’s office operated primarily in pursuit of its own institutional interests. Given that both the Prosecutor General and the Minister of Internal Affairs were political appointees, the police frequently served as a tool of political influence rather than as an impartial law enforcement body.

Ultimately, Ukrainian society expected more than I was able to deliver, as the reform did not reach its full potential. Nevertheless, I believe that the most significant component of the police reform – the patrol police – was genuinely felt by the public.

The level of engagement from international donors and civil society was unprecedented. This collaborative effort laid the foundation for a new model of public service, one that prioritized transparency, accountability, and citizen trust.

During Russia’s full-scale invasion, both the patrol police and the reformed criminal police demonstrated that the protection of citizens and patriotic commitment were paramount. Their response under crisis conditions reaffirmed the core values of the reform and highlighted the resilience and dedication of Ukraine’s law enforcement institutions.

Khatia Dekanoidze

• Member of Parliament of Georgia
• Minister of Education and Science of Georgia (2012)
• Chief of the National Police of Ukraine (2015–2016)