The Sahel’s Descent: How Russian Mercenaries Failed Where France Fell Short
Three years ago, Mali’s military junta celebrated the expulsion of French forces — a defiant rejection of colonial legacy that resonated widely across the nation. Russian mercenaries arrived as replacements, pledging to safeguard the ruling regime and crush a persistent Islamist insurgency. The outcome tells a different story. As al-Qaida-affiliated Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) now strangles Bamako with a devastating fuel blockade and coup rumors circulate once more, it’s evident that Moscow’s proxies have delivered neither security nor stability.
A New Terrorism Epicenter
The Sahel has quietly become the world’s terrorism hotspot. According to the Global Terrorism Index, over half of global terrorism fatalities last year occurred in this semi-arid belt stretching below the Sahara, predominantly attributed to groups aligned with ISIS and al-Qaeda. Neighboring Burkina Faso tops the death toll rankings, experiencing a parallel crisis. There, Ibrahim Traoré — whose nationalist rhetoric has earned him popular acclaim despite seizing power through a coup — governs less than half the national territory, with JNIM controlling much of the remainder.
Traoré famously urged fellow African leaders to “stop behaving like puppets every time the imperialists pull the strings“. Yet the Sahel risks merely exchanging one form of domination for another. Russian mercenaries, first under Wagner and now the Africa Corps, face credible allegations of human rights violations. In Mali, Russian forces have demonstrated minimal commitment to breaking the Bamako siege while prioritizing protection of gold mining operations.
Dangerous Isolation
Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have severed relationships not only with France but also with the UN and United States. These three coup-led nations have deepened their isolation by withdrawing from the regional Economic Community of West African States. Their confrontational self-reliance leads nowhere productive.
Wealthier coastal nations fear militant Islam will migrate southward. Countries including Benin, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Togo, and Ghana — many experiencing relative economic success—have legitimate concerns. Nigeria, grappling with separate militant challenges, worries about contagion spreading across its lengthy, porous border with Niger.
Strategic Western Engagement
The West has compelling interests in supporting coastal states against this threat through intelligence sharing, training, and military cooperation where welcomed. Donald Trump’s unilateral threats to attack Nigeria over what he mischaracterizes as Christian genocide prove counterproductive. However, Nigeria and neighboring governments could potentially reshape such offers into beneficial partnerships through intelligent diplomacy.
Europe has largely abandoned the Sahel — understandably so in France’s case given its deep unpopularity. Yet complete disengagement carries risks. Expanding militancy could drive desperate young people toward dangerous Mediterranean crossings seeking better prospects.
Europe might contribute effectively by developing online strategies countering Russian disinformation that redirects youth frustration into anti-Western, pro-military channels. Additional risk capital through institutions like the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development could also help. Employment opportunities remain the most effective defense against radicaliіation.
The Path Forward
Ultimately, addressing the volatile combination of Islamist militancy and Russian interference requires effective governance — primarily the responsibility of these nations themselves. Yet when outsiders can provide constructive assistance, doing so serves their own strategic interests.
See: Khalaf, R. (2025). Jihadism and Russia: a toxic mix in the Sahel. Financial Times. November 16 2025
