The Concept of the ‘Russian World’: from a Cultural Project to an Instrument of Aggression
The concept of the ‘Russian World’ originated in the 1990s among members of the Moscow Methodological Circle, who had close ties to the Russian political elite. The authors of the modern concept are considered to be members of the Moscow Methodological Circle – a philosophical-methodological and intellectual-practical school of the Soviet methodologist and philosopher Georgy Shchedrovitsky, whose roots date back to the 1950s. This intellectual centre brought together philosophers, sociologists, psychologists and managers who developed specific methodological approaches to the analysis and construction of social systems.
The roots of this ideologeme date back to the late 1990s, when three political strategists – Pyotr Shchedrovitsky (son of the circle’s founder), Serhiy Hradyrovsky and Yefim Ostrovsky – constructed the concept of the ‘Russian World’ as one of the solutions to the problem of the collapse of the post-Soviet environment and Russia’s loss of its dominant position in the post-Soviet space. They proposed language as a bridge that would connect the independent post-Soviet states that were diverging in different directions. The Russian language could be a link to the homeland for those Russians who emigrated after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as for those who remained in the territories of the newly formed states. The language organises them into an intellectual network – without a single centre of gravity and without a clear political agenda.
Petro Shchedrovitsky defined the ‘Russian world’ as ‘a network structure of large and small communities that think and speak Russian.’ This initial concept was primarily cultural and linguistic in nature and did not envisage strict political centralisation or territorial claims. However, this formula already contained the idea of a supra-territorial identity that could compete with the state sovereignty of the newly formed independent states.
Ideological foundations and target audience
The concept is based on the idea of protecting the rights of so-called ‘compatriots’ – members of the Russian diaspora or Russian-speaking minorities who remained living in other states after the collapse of the USSR. The concept of ‘compatriots’ is not legal, but rather symbolic – the Kremlin’s ideology is based on the assumption that these people have a certain emotional attachment to common cultural narratives based on the use of the Russian language, regardless of their citizenship or ethnicity.
This concept is deliberately vague and may include: ethnic Russians living outside the Russian Federation; citizens of other states who speak Russian; bearers of Soviet cultural identity; and any individuals who have a ‘spiritual connection’ with Russia. This vagueness allows the Kremlin to arbitrarily expand the circle of ‘compatriots’ depending on political expediency.
Particular importance is attached to ‘Russian minorities’ in the near abroad – the European countries of the former USSR, including Ukraine, Moldova, the Baltic states, as well as territories with a complex political status and a significant proportion of Russian-speaking population – Crimea, Donbas and Transnistria. These regions are considered priority targets for the implementation of the ‘Russian World’ concept and the spread of Russian influence.
Institutionalisation and politicisation of the concept
In the 2000s, this ideological construct was incorporated into Russia’s official political discourse and became the theoretical basis for the policy of protecting so-called compatriots abroad. The process of institutionalisation was accompanied by the creation of special structures and mechanisms for implementing the concept.
In 2007, the Russkiy Mir Foundation was established as a state structure designed to promote the Russian language and culture abroad. The Russkiy Mir Foundation was established by a decree of the President of the Russian Federation on 21 June 2007. A series of decrees in 2021-2024 (Nos. 215, 696, 451) radically restructured the foundation, strengthening its subordination to the state (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 21 June 2007, Decree of the President of the Russian Federation ‘On Certain Issues of the Russkiy Mir Foundation’ of 12 April 2021 No. 215; Decree of the President of the Russian Federation ‘On Certain Issues of the Activities of the Russkiy Mir Foundation’ dated 18 September 2023 No. 696; Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated 30 May 2024 No. 451 ‘On the Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Russkiy Mir Foundation’). The founder of the Foundation was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.
The official mission of the Foundation (preamble to Decree No. 696 of 2023) is to support and promote the Russian language in the world, strengthen its position as a language of international communication and a key tool for increasing the significance of the Russian Federation in the global humanitarian space.
The fund’s objectives include: supporting Russian education abroad, financing Russian-language media abroad, preserving Russian cultural and historical heritage, supporting Russian compatriots, disseminating ‘objective information about the Russian Federation,’ and organising cultural and educational events.
An analysis of the foundation’s structure and activities reveals its function as a central instrument of Russia’s neo-imperial policy:
1. Institutional subordination: The complete control of the Russian Foreign Ministry and the direct involvement of top Russian state officials indicate that the foundation is a state instrument of foreign policy rather than an autonomous cultural organisation.
2. Ideological basis: The concept of the ‘Russian World’ is a neo-imperial construct that justifies Moscow’s claims to the post-Soviet space and Russian-speaking communities globally. It postulates a single ‘Russian world,’ independent of state borders, with its centre in Moscow.
3. Geopolitical instruments: ‘Russian centres’ function as cultural and political outposts of influence. The grant programme creates networks of loyalty among local elites and organisations. Media resources spread the Kremlin’s narrative under the guise of ‘objective information’.
4. Mobilisation of diasporas: Work with ‘compatriots abroad’ uses Russian-speaking communities as a tool to influence the policies of their countries of residence, creating a ‘fifth column’ for Russian interests.
5. Undermining sovereignty: The promotion of the Russian language and culture is presented as a cultural activity, but in fact undermines the linguistic and cultural sovereignty of other states, especially post-Soviet countries, including Ukraine.
6. Legitimisation of aggression: The ideology of the ‘Russian World’ has been used to justify Russian aggression against Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (since 2014). The foundation creates an informational and cultural basis for the Kremlin’s narrative of ‘protecting the Russian-speaking population.’
The Russkiy Mir Foundation is a key element of Russia’s ‘soft power’ strategy, integrated into the Russian Federation’s foreign policy system. Under the guise of cultural and educational activities, the foundation implements a neo-imperial agenda: creating a transnational network of influence, undermining the sovereignty of independent states, and forming an ideological justification for Russian expansion.
In 2006, Vladimir Putin stated: “The Russian world can and must unite all those who cherish the Russian language and Russian culture, wherever they live, in Russia or beyond its borders. Use this phrase more often – “Russian world”.‘ This statement marked the transition of the concept from the realm of intellectual discussion to the realm of practical foreign policy.
Since 2008, the narrative about the need to build and defend the ’Russian World” has been used by the Russian government as a foreign policy doctrine. The concept envisages the unification of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, as well as strengthening influence in countries with a large Russian-speaking population, such as the Baltic states. At the same time, the original network model is gradually being narrowed down to a rigid hierarchical system with Moscow as the sole centre.
Thus, the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of 12 July 2008 emphasised that “Russia sees its task as protecting the rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens and compatriots living abroad on the basis of international law and existing bilateral agreements, considering the multi-million Russian diaspora — the Russian World — as a partner.‘ This formula became the legal basis for Russia’s further interference in the internal affairs of other states under the pretext of protecting ’compatriots.”
The role of the Russian Orthodox Church
An important element of the ‘Russian World’ concept was its combination with a religious component. The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) actively contributed to the development and spread of this ideology, giving it a spiritual dimension. Patriarch Kirill has repeatedly spoken of the ‘Russian World’ as a spiritual and civilisational space that unites Russia, Ukraine and Belarus on the basis of a common Orthodox faith and cultural heritage.
The ROC uses its extensive network of parishes and monasteries outside Russia to spread the ideology of the ‘Russian World,’ presenting it as a natural continuation of religious tradition. This activity is particularly active in Ukraine, where the Moscow Patriarchate tried to maintain control over a significant part of the Orthodox parishes until the creation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine in 2019.
The religious discourse of the ‘Russian World’ appeals to the idea of ‘Holy Rus’ — a mythologised image of a unified Orthodox space centred in Moscow as the ‘Third Rome.’ This adds a sacred dimension to the concept and allows the Kremlin’s political goals to be presented as the fulfilment of a sacred mission.
Transformation into a military-political instrument
After 2008, Russkiy Mir transformed from a cultural and value-based concept into a key instrument of the Kremlin’s aggressive foreign policy. This ideology became the basis for justifying military interventions and expanding Russian influence in the post-Soviet space, particularly in Ukraine. The turning point came with the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, when the concept of protecting ‘compatriots’ was used for the first time to justify military aggression.
In August 2008, Russia invaded Georgia under the pretext of protecting the population of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. After the end of hostilities, Russia recognised the independence of these regions and established military bases there. This precedent demonstrated the Kremlin’s willingness to use military force to implement the concept of ‘Russkiy Mir’ and created a model of ‘frozen conflicts’ that was later applied in Ukraine.
In 2014 and 2022, the doctrine of the so-called ‘Russian World’ was used by the Russian authorities to justify the military invasion of Ukraine. The annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of war in Donbas in 2014 were accompanied by an intense propaganda campaign about ‘protecting the Russian-speaking population from the Kyiv junta’ and ‘reuniting Russian lands.’ The full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022 was the culmination of this policy – Putin openly declared his intention to ‘denazify’ and ‘demilitarise’ Ukraine, effectively denying its right to exist as an independent state.
Mechanisms for implementing the concept
The Kremlin uses a variety of tools to implement the concept of ‘Russkiy Mir’:
Information and propaganda: state media (Russia Today, Sputnik), social networks, troll factories, dissemination of disinformation and conspiracy theories aimed at discrediting democratic institutions and pro-European governments in neighbouring countries.
Cultural and educational: a network of ‘Russian World’ centres at foreign universities, funding pro-Russian cultural organisations, supporting Russian-language media abroad, promoting the Russian version of history through textbooks and academic publications.
Economic: energy blackmail (especially against countries dependent on Russian gas), investment in strategic sectors of the economy, corruption schemes to create pro-Russian business elites, control over critical infrastructure.
Political: funding pro-Russian political parties and movements, supporting separatist groups, diplomatic pressure, using international organisations (in particular, the CIS, CSTO, Eurasian Economic Union) to promote Russian interests.
Military-force: creation and support of separatist pseudo-states (Transnistria, ‘DPR/LPR’, Abkhazia, South Ossetia), presence of Russian military bases on the territory of other states, hybrid operations using ‘little green men’ and mercenaries, cyberattacks against critical infrastructure.
The neo-imperialist nature of the concept
In fact, the concept of ‘Russkiy Mir’ functions as a neo-imperialist doctrine that legitimises the violation of the sovereignty of independent states under the pretext of protecting ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking populations. It continues the long tradition of Russian imperialism, adapting it to the realities of the 21st century.
Unlike classical 19th-century colonialism, ‘Russian World’ does not always seek formal annexation of territories (although this does happen, as in the case of Crimea in Ukraine), but rather the creation of zones of influence where Moscow retains de facto control over political, economic and cultural processes while formally preserving state independence. This allows the Kremlin to avoid direct responsibility for the situation in these territories and reduce international pressure.
The concept is based on denying the former Soviet republics the right to full sovereignty and their own path of development. Russia considers them its ‘natural sphere of influence’ and believes it has the right to interfere in their internal affairs. This is particularly true of Ukraine, which Russian propaganda presents not as a separate nation, but as part of the ‘triune Russian people’ together with Russians and Belarusians.
The ideology of the ‘Russian World’ also serves a domestic political function in Russia itself, legitimising Putin’s authoritarian regime by appealing to ‘great power’ and contrasting Russia with the ‘hostile West’. It creates the illusion of Russia’s special civilisational mission and justifies the sacrifices associated with aggressive foreign policy and international isolation.
Consequences and prospects
Thus, over three decades, Russkiy Mir has evolved from an abstract intellectual idea into a practical tool for Russian expansion and aggression. This concept demonstrates how cultural and linguistic narratives can be transformed into an ideological justification for neo-imperialist policies and war crimes.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was a moment of truth for the concept of Russkiy Mir, revealing its true nature – not cultural unification, but violent subjugation. The mass atrocities committed by the Russian army, the destruction of Ukrainian cities, the deportation of the population, and the forced Russification of the occupied territories have finally exposed the neo-colonial nature of this ideology.
The failure of the rapid military operation and Ukraine’s fierce resistance refuted the main tenets of the ‘Russian World’ about the alleged unity of the ‘triune Russian people’ and the Ukrainians’ expectation of ‘liberators.’ On the contrary, the aggression only strengthened Ukrainian national identity and finally turned the Ukrainian people away from Russia.
The future of the ‘Russian World’ concept depends on the outcome of the war in Ukraine. Russia’s defeat would mean the collapse of this neo-imperialist doctrine and a possible rethinking of Russian identity without imperial ambitions. However, even if active hostilities cease, the ideological confrontation will continue, as ‘Russian World’ remains the basis of the legitimacy of Putin’s regime and the worldview of a significant part of Russian society.
