Legislative Preparation for Aggression: the New Russian Law on Extraterritorial Use of Armed Forces
On May 13, 2026, the State Duma of the Russian Federation adopted, in its second and third readings, a bill on the “extraterritorial” use of armed forces to protect Russian citizens abroad. The law was passed by 381 deputies — 84.7% of the total membership of the parliament. There were no votes against and no abstentions. Such unanimity is itself symptomatic: it reflects not merely the absence of parliamentary debate, but unconditional institutional support for the new legal mechanism.
The law, developed by the Russian Ministry of Defense and submitted to the State Duma on March 19, 2026, grants the President of Russia the authority to decide on the use of armed forces outside the state’s territory in cases where Russian citizens are “arrested, detained, or subject to criminal or other prosecution by decisions of foreign courts” — with particular reference to courts “empowered by other foreign states without Russia’s participation,” as well as international judicial bodies “whose jurisdiction is not based on an international treaty of the Russian Federation or a UN Security Council resolution.”
At first glance, the law may appear to be a purely technical addition to Article 8 of Federal Law No. 390 “On Security,” which already provided for the president’s right to “take measures” to protect citizens. However, as will be shown below, the enacted legislation represents a fundamentally new step: it transforms vague discretion into a clearly defined normative basis for armed intervention, thereby legitimizing the doctrine of extraterritorial use of force.
NEW CONCEPTUAL PRIORITIES OF THE RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES AND THEIR CONNECTION TO THE LAW
The law of May 13, 2026 is not an isolated normative act. It fits organically into the broader system of transformation of Russia’s military-doctrinal planning. At the expanded collegium of the Russian Ministry of Defense on December 17, 2025, Minister Andrei Belousov outlined the priorities for the development of the armed forces for 2026–2030. Key orientations include the development of unmanned systems, digitization of military command, strengthening of air defense, and the implementation of a new State Armament Program (2027–2036) with emphasis on nuclear deterrence and electronic warfare capabilities. At the same time, plans for the development of the Russian armed forces, according to Belousov, are directly “linked to Western actions” — a formulation of doctrinal significance: it sanctions a reactive logic in which any NATO expansion or enhancement of missile defense becomes grounds for further militarization.
This is confirmed by the general structure of the 2014 Military Doctrine, which lists among “external military dangers” the “deployment (build-up) of military contingents of foreign states (groups of states) on the territories of states adjacent to the Russian Federation.” Thus, the new priorities for the development of the armed forces form, together with the 2026 law, a systemic architecture: the doctrine defines the grounds for activation, the armament program provides the means, and the new law grants the president sufficient legal tools to make decisions unconstrained by international institutions.
Significantly, within the framework of the new concept for the Russian armed forces, according to Reporters and Kommersant, special attention is paid to “long-term” planning. Belousov explicitly stated that “in the context of NATO’s accelerated military buildup and the growth of the alliance’s defense spending, short-term planning is losing its effectiveness.” The new legislative powers of the president are thus part of this long-term horizon — a legal instrument prepared for the future, applicable in any configuration of conflict.
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DIMENSION: SYSTEMATIC VIOLATION OF SOVEREIGNTY
From the standpoint of international law, Russia’s 2026 law challenges at least three fundamental principles of international law. First, the principle of sovereign equality of states and non-interference in their internal affairs (Articles 2(1) and 2(7) of the UN Charter). Second, the prohibition on the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state (Article 2(4) of the UN Charter). Third, the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes (Article 33 of the UN Charter).
Critically important is the law’s orientation against decisions of the International Criminal Court. The ICC has issued arrest warrants for President Putin, Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova, and several senior Russian military commanders. Thus, a literal and systemic interpretation of the new law allows the President of Russia to use armed force in order to obstruct the execution of ICC warrants — that is, to protect persons against whom proceedings for war crimes have been initiated. Such a provision has no analogue in the practice of states that claim participation in the international legal order.
It is also important to consider the warnings from NATO and Western intelligence services, highlighted by Ukrainska Pravda: the head of the BND warned as early as the summer of 2025 about the risk of provocations in the Baltic states “along the Crimean scenario,” and the French Chief of the General Staff, General Fabien Mändon, called for preparation for a confrontation with Russia within 3–4 years. ISW analysts recorded the beginning of a “phase zero” of preparations for such actions: the restructuring of military districts, deployment of bases near the Finnish border, sabotage operations, and GPS jamming in Europe. The enacted law fits naturally into this context as a normative enabler — a legislative enabler that removes the last legal obstacles to presidential decisions on the use of force.
CONCLUSIONS
The law of the State Duma of the Russian Federation of May 13, 2026, on the extraterritorial use of armed forces represents the normative culmination of a doctrinal architecture that has been taking shape in Russia for at least two decades. It operationalizes the provisions of the 2014 Military Doctrine, fits within the new priorities for the development of the Russian armed forces for 2026–2030, and creates a legal basis for armed action against the exercise of international jurisdiction — including decisions of the ICC.
An analysis of the law through the lens of doctrine makes it possible to conclude: Russia is deliberately constructing a normative framework in which the protection of “its citizens” abroad is legally equivalent to a casus belli that requires no approval from international institutions. This is not a defensive mechanism, but an offensive one — an instrument granting the president full discretion in decisions on the use of force, in the absence of any external legal constraints.
From a practical standpoint, the law can be applied against any member state of the ICC, any participant in international investigations of Russia’s war crimes, and in any situation where a foreign court has issued a decision concerning a person recognized by Moscow as “its own.” The systemic threat posed by this law demands an adequate and coordinated response from the international community — including the adoption of clear legal positions on the inadmissibility of such normative constructions and their characterization as inherently aggressive in nature.
