Mykola Polovyi, Olena Chaltseva: Impact of the war on social and political institutes
Just as the armed forces are considered a mirror of society, conflict is a manifestation of relationships within a collective, and war is an effective manifestation of all social processes and relationships.
Everything, both positive and negative, in social relations and political processes that was not noticeable in peacetime, which people tried not to notice during Russia’s covert war against Ukraine since 2014, became apparent and almost impossible to ignore after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation.
Various problems inherent in any society, which are entirely solvable and not critical in peacetime, have intensified after the invasion and are increasingly affecting social life and the state.
These issues have been compounded by the turmoil caused directly by military action. In fact, they should be mentioned first as the most significant factors of social change.
The mass displacement of millions of people caused by the War is one of the most decisive factors. More than a third of Ukraine’s population was forced to leave their homes, searching for safety in the central and western regions and abroad.
Although this displacement took place in several waves – the early episodes began as early as 2014 were followed by a mass exodus after the full-scale invasion in 2022 – the bulk of internally displaced persons and those who left the country took place in 2022 and continues to grow slowly with the gradual advance of Russian troops.
Internally displaced persons in Ukraine often face significant bureaucratic obstacles and limited access to social services, while refugees who have crossed international borders face problems with integration, language barriers and uncertainty about long-term residence.
Host countries, including Poland, Germany, and the United Kingdom, have responded with various measures to accommodate Ukrainian refugees, including visa programmes and temporary protection directives that provide housing and social support. However, despite these initiatives, many refugees still face difficulties entering the labour market and overcoming the psychological trauma of forced displacement. Conditions for refugees are also complicated by the risks of exploitation, including human trafficking.
The relationship between the intention to return home and permanent integration in countries of asylum remains complex: although many refugees express a desire to eventually return, the ongoing danger and economic instability in Ukraine suggest that a significant proportion may remain abroad permanently, thereby changing the country’s demographic landscape for the long term.
One of the most enduring consequences of the War is its profound impact on Ukraine’s demographic trajectory.
Before the invasion, Ukraine was already experiencing a prolonged population decline, exacerbated by low birth rates and significant emigration; the War has dramatically accelerated these trends. Mass population displacement – both internal and international – has led to an ageing demographic profile and a shrinking labour force, creating significant challenges for both current production and post-war reconstruction when it begins.
This will have a particular impact on the social security system. In addition, the uneven distribution of refugees by gender – the vast majority of whom are women and children due to restrictions on conscription for men – has changed family structures and labour market dynamics.
This demographic imbalance puts additional pressure on social services and creates long-term challenges in the areas of healthcare and the pension system.
The education sector in Ukraine has been severely and profoundly destabilised by the War. Schools in combat zones have been damaged or used for military and humanitarian purposes, while mass displacement has forced children and adolescents to leave their familiar learning environments and move to makeshift educational settings or educational institutions in host countries.
The secondary and higher education system in Ukraine-controlled territory is also feeling the impact of the War in the form of disruption to the usual face-to-face learning regime, a reduction and/or change in the staffing of secondary and higher education institutions, aberrations in the goals of students due to shifts in social norms and the uncertainty of the socio-political situation caused by the war.
The main problem is the drastic reduction in the planning horizon for all participants in the educational process as a result of a similar process in the social life of the entire country. Uncertainty about tomorrow and the perception of a year’s perspective as a decade of peacetime breeds apathy and a lack of planning for one’s own future, which is reflected in a decline in motivation to learn among students and to teach among teachers.
In the long term, this will have significant negative consequences for the development of human capital and the future competitiveness of graduates in the labour market, further exacerbating demographic concerns and economic uncertainty in the country. It should be noted that, despite the absence of a threat to the lives of Ukrainians who have left the country, the factor of reduced planning horizons also has a negative impact on their educational motivation and is reflected in the corresponding results.
The forced migration of millions of highly skilled workers, combined with the destruction of industrial enterprises and ongoing security issues, has led to a significant reduction in the available labour force and a drastic decline in Ukraine’s labour market.
In addition, the displacement of working-age citizens contributes to a ‘brain drain’ that undermines the prospects for future economic recovery and further exacerbates long-term demographic problems. The mobilisation of men of prime working age is already having an additional impact on the country’s economic development and will continue to do so for a long time to come.
Obviously, the War has led to a large-scale psychological crisis. More than half of displaced individuals and refugees have symptoms of PTSD, with women with children and those who have lost loved ones being particularly vulnerable. Chronic stress, uncertainty and the constant risk of violence are destroying adaptation mechanisms.
Against the backdrop of the above-mentioned processes, there is a paradoxical increase in social cohesion, manifested, for example, in the volunteer movement and mass donations to the army, and social atomisation, which causes, among other things, the phenomenon of ‘draft dodging’ and sometimes blatant manifestations of corruption and embezzlement.
As a result of the military actions, Ukraine’s economic system has become extremely vulnerable and dependent on external support, and this state of affairs is compounded by greater uncertainty in people’s lives as a result of the military actions.
This leads to a gradual accumulation of pessimism and a syndrome of helplessness at the general social level, which will take a long time to overcome after the war ends.
Thus, in contemporary Ukrainian society during wartime, it is easy to see all the possible negative features of social life, as well as to identify many seeds of a strong, self-sufficient society.
The main problem, not only scientific but also practical, remains which set of social traits – flaws or advantages – will prevail in Ukraine under the influence of the changing processes of wartime.
