The Concept of ‘Russkiy Mir’ in the Kremlin’s Official Position (Analysis of the Press Conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation)

The concept of the ‘Russian World’ (Russian: ‘Русский мир’) is a key ideologeme of contemporary Russian foreign policy, justifying Moscow’s imperial claims in the post-Soviet space. Although the term is not directly mentioned in the transcript of the press conference of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (January 2026), its conceptual elements permeate the entire speech through a system of narratives about ‘Russian civilisation’, the protection of ‘Russian speakers’, Eurasian integration, and opposition to the ‘collective West’.

An analysis of Sergey Lavrov’s speech and his answers to journalists’ questions reveals four main dimensions of the concept of the ‘Russian World’ in the Minister’s speech: (1) civilisational – the assertion of Russia as a separate civilisation with a ‘thousand-year history’; (2) linguistic-cultural – justification of the ‘right’ to intervene to protect the Russian language and culture; (3) geopolitical – Eurasian integration as a form of neo-imperial expansion; (4) revisionist – revision of the results of World War II and the international order.

MAIN MANIFESTATIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF THE ‘RUSSIAN WORLD’

2.1. ‘Russian civilisation’ as an ideological basis

The central element of the speech is the positioning of Russia as a separate ‘civilisation’ opposed to the West. Lavrov emphasises: ‘Russia, as our new modern foreign policy concept states, is a country of civilisation. We will not renounce our roots, we have no right to do so, we honour the memory of our ancestors and we honour the covenants that our ancestors left us’.

This statement has several important implications:

First, it posits the civilisational exceptionalism of Russia, which allegedly does not fit into the pan-European or global context. Second, the appeal to ‘millennial history’ and ‘ancestral covenants’ creates the illusion of historical continuity, which justifies contemporary territorial claims. Third, the concept of a ‘civilisation-state’ allows Moscow to claim ‘natural influence’ over all who belong to this imaginary community, regardless of state borders.

It is characteristic that Lavrov lists other ‘great civilisations’ of Eurasia – Chinese, Iranian, Arab, Indian – but not the civilisations of other peoples, thereby denying the civilisational subjectivity of these peoples and inscribing them into the ‘Russian world.’

2.2. Protection of ‘Russian speakers’ as a casus belli

A key tool for implementing the concept of the ‘Russian world’ is the construction of an image of ‘oppressed Russian speakers’ who need protection from Moscow.

Lavrov systematically returns to the topic of the ‘rights of Russian-speaking Russians’ in Ukraine, accusing the Kyiv regime of ‘exterminating and legislatively, and indeed physically, destroying all Russian education, language and culture’.

Particularly telling is his criticism that in the latest versions of the American proposals for a settlement, ‘there was no mention of the need to restore the rights of the Russian language and the canonical Orthodox Church’. Lavrov insists that the settlement must include: (1) the lifting of bans on the use of the Russian language in all spheres; (2) the restoration of the activities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate; (3) not just ‘tolerance’ but full recognition of the rights of the ‘Russian-speaking population’.

This rhetoric serves two purposes: first, it legitimises military aggression as ‘protection of compatriots’; second, it lays the groundwork for future interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine and other states under the pretext of ‘protecting the rights of Russian speakers’. It is important to note that this does not refer to citizens of the Russian Federation, but to all ‘Russian speakers’ – a category that, in the logic of the ‘Russian world,’ automatically falls within the sphere of Russian interests.

2.3. Eurasian integration as a neo-imperial project

Lavrov devotes a significant part of his speech to promoting the concept of ‘Eurasian security’ and ‘great Eurasian partnership’. At first glance, these appear to be legitimate regional initiatives, but a detailed analysis reveals their neo-imperial nature:

‘Our line is to create a belt of good neighbourliness and cooperation in the near abroad within the framework of the CIS, the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’ – this list of structures forms a multi-level system of control over the post-Soviet space, where Russia positions itself as the natural hegemon.

Particularly telling is the Russian-Belarusian initiative on the ‘Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st Century,’ which, according to Lavrov, ‘is open to participation by all, without exception, states of the Eurasian continent.’ This initiative effectively proposes an alternative international order, with Russia as the architect of the new ‘rules of the game.’ It is characteristic that Lavrov emphasises the incompatibility of the OSCE (where Russia is in the minority) with the new ‘Eurasian architecture’ – this indicates a desire to replace existing international institutions with ones where Moscow will have a dominant position.

The concept of a ‘belt of good neighbourliness’ is a direct continuation of the ‘near abroad’ doctrine, which denies the full sovereignty of the former Soviet republics. When Lavrov talks about ‘eliminating the root causes’ of the Ukrainian crisis, he is referring not to the causes of the conflict, but to the very existence of Ukraine as a sovereign state with a European choice.

2.4. Manipulation of historical memory

An important element of the concept of the ‘Russian world’ is the monopolisation of historical memory, especially with regard to the Second World War. Lavrov pays a lot of attention to the ‘lessons’ and ‘memory’ of the war, where Russia is positioned as the sole heir to the victory over Nazism:

‘These two events [the parade in Moscow and the events in Beijing] clearly demonstrated that the overwhelming majority of states do not want to forget the memory, lessons and history of World War II’. At the same time, the role of Ukraine and other republics of the USSR in the victory is silenced, and any criticism of Soviet policy is equated with ‘rewriting history.’

Lavrov’s remark about German Chancellor Merz is particularly cynical: “Mr Merz recently said that Russia must not be allowed to get its way in Ukraine, as this would be tantamount to appeasing Hitler. What do you think of this statement?” This passage reveals a manipulative logic: criticism of Russian aggression is equated with ’appeasing the aggressor‘, while Russia itself is portrayed as a victim of the ’Nazi regime’ in Kyiv.

2.5. Projection onto other regions: Armenia, Moldova, Serbia

Lavrov’s speech clearly demonstrates that the concept of the ‘Russian world’ is not limited to Ukraine. He pays particular attention to Armenia, criticising its move towards the EU and warning of a ‘Moldovan scenario’ where, in his words, ‘the elections were rigged in the most blatant manner.’ Threats to apply the ‘Moldovan scenario’ in Yerevan are a blatant interference in internal affairs and intimidation.

A telling comment is the one about the arrest of Armenian politician Vartan Gukasyan, who ‘is being blamed for calling for consideration of Armenia’s accession to the Union of Russia and Belarus.’ Lavrov presents this as a violation of freedom of speech, although in reality it is a call for the elimination of Armenia’s state sovereignty.

Regarding Serbia, Lavrov criticises the EU for demanding that it recognise Kosovo’s independence and join the sanctions against Russia as a condition of membership, calling it ‘humiliating’. At the same time, Moscow itself demands that Armenia renounce European integration as a condition for maintaining relations. This double standard is characteristic of the entire logic of the ‘Russian world’.

3. Instrumentalisation of international law

A paradoxical feature of Lavrov’s speech is his simultaneous appeal to international law and its selective application. On the one hand, he criticises the ‘rules-based order of the West and calls for a return to the UN Charter. On the other hand, he openly approves of Trump’s statement that ‘he is not interested in international law and that all norms of behaviour in the international arena are determined by his own morality’.

This ambivalence is not inconsistency – it reflects an instrumental approach to law. International law is applied when it is beneficial (for example, to criticise NATO) and ignored when it conflicts with interests (as in the case of aggression against Ukraine). Lavrov is effectively proposing the ‘law of the strong,’ cloaked in rhetoric about ‘equality’ and ‘balance of interests,’ where “balance” is determined by power: ‘In an equal dialogue, the one with more resources will have more influence on the outcome’.

CONCLUSIONS: THREATS AND CONSEQUENCES

An analysis of Sergey Lavrov’s speech allows us to draw the following conclusions about the concept of the ‘Russian World’ and its practical implementation in Russian foreign policy:

1. The totality of the concept. The ‘Russian World’ is not limited to the cultural and linguistic sphere but is a comprehensive ideology that legitimises Russian hegemony through civilisational, historical, geopolitical and security dimensions. Even without being explicitly named, this concept structures the entire logic of the Kremlin’s foreign policy discourse.

2. Incompatibility with sovereignty. The concept of ‘Russian civilisation’ and ‘protection of Russian speakers’ is fundamentally incompatible with the recognition of the full sovereignty of post-Soviet states. For Moscow, the existence of Ukraine, Armenia or other countries as subjects with their own civilisational choices is unacceptable. Therefore, any ‘settlement’ on Russian terms would mean turning these states into vassal entities.

3. Expansionist nature. ‘Eurasian integration’, ‘the great Eurasian space’, ‘the belt of good neighbourliness’ – all these concepts are euphemisms for the restoration of Russian dominance in the post-Soviet space. The aggression against Ukraine is not an anomaly, but a logical embodiment of this ideology. Lavrov openly warns Armenia, Moldova and other countries about the fate that awaits them if they attempt to break free from Russian influence.

4. Strategic threat to the international order. Russia’s attempts to replace universal international institutions (the UN, OSCE) with ‘Eurasian’ structures under its control undermine the global security system. This is not a reform of the existing order, but its dismantling in order to create spheres of exclusive influence for the great powers.

5. The need for a strategic response. Countering the concept of the ‘Russian World’ requires not only military assistance to Ukraine, but also systematic work to deconstruct this ideology, support the independence of post-Soviet democracies, strengthen international institutions, and document Russian crimes. Any attempts at ‘reconciliation’ through concessions of territory or sovereignty will only encourage further expansion.

Lavrov’s speech is an example of 21st-century imperial rhetoric, where overt aggression is presented as the defence of civilisational values, occupation as liberation, and the destruction of sovereignty as integration. Understanding these mechanisms is critical to formulating an adequate response to the Russian threat, both in Ukraine and in the broader regional and global contexts.