Foreign Aggression, Own ‘Operation’: How Russia Appropriated the Language of International Law
At the end of February 2026, the Russian Foreign Ministry published a series of official statements in connection with the start of military operations by the United States and Israel against Iran. These documents are a masterpiece of diplomatic hypocrisy, which is worth analysing in detail.
The Russian Foreign Ministry ‘strongly condemned’ the attack on Iran, calling it ‘a gross act of aggression that violates international law.’ Moscow stated that the scale and nature of the military and political preparations that preceded the strikes ‘leave no doubt that this is a premeditated and unprovoked act of armed aggression.’ The statement emphasised that the actions of the United States and Israel ‘violate the fundamental principles of international law and are directed against a sovereign state, a member of the United Nations.’
Russia condemned the practice of ‘political assassinations and “hunting” of leaders of sovereign states,’ calling the attacks ‘a reckless step’ that brings the region closer to ‘a humanitarian, economic and, possibly, radiological catastrophe.’ The Foreign Ministry demanded that ‘the situation be immediately returned to the path of political and diplomatic settlement’ and announced its readiness to ‘promote a peaceful solution based on international law and mutual respect.’
Beautiful words. Only one thing is strange: why has Moscow never applied these same words to itself?
‘PREMEDITATED AND UNPROVOKED’: A MIRROR FOR MOSCOW
Let’s compare the rhetoric of the Russian Foreign Ministry on Iran with what Russia itself has been doing in Ukraine since 24 February 2022. Every phrase from the Foreign Ministry’s statements fits Russia’s actions in Ukraine better than those of the United States or Israel.
‘A premeditated and unprovoked act of armed aggression’ — this is how the UN and the International Court of Justice described Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in their resolutions.
Russia had been preparing for the invasion for months — concentrating troops, transferring equipment, and forming DRG units. There was no ‘provocation’ on the part of Ukraine: Kyiv did not attack Russia, did not threaten its sovereignty, and did not attempt to occupy a single square kilometre of Russian territory. The Kremlin’s arguments about the ‘threat from NATO’ or ‘protecting the Russian-speaking population’ were and remain fabricated pretexts that have no legal basis in either the UN Charter or general international law.
‘Violation of the fundamental principles of international law directed against a sovereign state — a member of the UN’ — Article 2(4) of the UN Charter explicitly prohibits what Russia has done and continues to do in Ukraine.
Russia occupied and attempted to annex Crimea in 2014, occupied parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and in September 2022 announced the ‘annexation’ of four regions of Ukraine to its territory, without controlling any of them completely. The 2022 ruling of the International Court of Justice obliged Russia to cease hostilities. The UN General Assembly, in its resolution ES-11/1, classified Russia’s actions as aggression. Russia ignored all of this.
‘The number of civilian casualties is constantly growing, and serious damage is being done to civilian infrastructure,’ is how the Russian Foreign Ministry describes the situation in Iran. But this is exactly what has been happening in Ukraine every day since 2022.
Russia systematically attacks Ukrainian hospitals, schools, residential buildings, thermal power plants and water supply systems. In the winter of 2022–2023 alone, massive missile strikes left millions of Ukrainians without heat, electricity, and water in freezing conditions. The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Putin and Lvova-Belova precisely for war crimes against the civilian population.
IMPERIAL AMBITIONS IN THE MIRROR OF ‘PEACEMAKING’ RHETORIC
The Russian Foreign Ministry’s statements on Iran should be seen not as a sincere condemnation of aggression, but as a continuation of Moscow’s traditional diplomatic tactics: using the language of international law only when and where it suits its own interests.
First, in 2025, Russia and Iran signed a bilateral comprehensive strategic partnership agreement for a period of 20 years, covering defence and the economy. Iran supplied Russia with Shahed strike drones, which it uses to attack Ukrainian cities, hospitals and power stations on a daily basis. Defending the sovereignty of its ally is not a legal principle, but a geopolitical calculation.
Second, the US and Israeli attack on Iran objectively served Russia’s strategic interests: the sharp rise in oil prices as a result of the conflict directly replenishes the Kremlin’s budget, which finances the war against Ukraine. While the whole world was watching Tehran, Moscow’s missiles continued to fly towards Kharkiv and Odesa.
Third, Moscow’s ‘peacemaking’ rhetoric on Iran is a classic ploy to divert attention and blur responsibility.
If Russia can act as the ‘voice of reason’ and call for a ‘diplomatic settlement’ in the Middle East, then in the eyes of part of the world it looks not like an aggressor, but like a ‘mature player’ on the international stage. Moscow actively cultivates this image, especially in the Global South.
This is a long-established strategy: to proclaim principles that you yourself do not adhere to in order to weaken their binding force for everyone. If ‘aggression’ is only what Russia’s enemies do, and Russia’s own actions are ‘special operations’ and ‘defence,’ then the very concept of aggression loses its legal meaning.
THE COLLAPSE OF THE ARGUMENT: WHAT RUSSIA’S OWN LANGUAGE SAYS ABOUT IT
Let’s turn directly to the language of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s statements on Iran and apply it to the Ukrainian question — just as any impartial observer would.
Russian Foreign Ministry: ‘strongly condemns the practice of political assassinations and “hunting” of leaders of sovereign states.’ — What do you call Putin’s order to eliminate Zelensky and other members of the Ukrainian government at the beginning of the invasion? Attempts to physically eliminate the President of Ukraine were recorded by several independent sources in the early days of the invasion in February 2022.
Russian Foreign Ministry: ‘attacks are carried out under the cover of the negotiation process.’ — Wasn’t it during the negotiations in Minsk that Russia was building up its forces and preparing for a full-scale invasion? Kyiv and the Minsk agreements were used by Moscow precisely as a cover for strategic preparations for the offensive — as Putin himself stated with remarkable candour.
Russian Foreign Ministry: ‘Moscow calls on the international community, including the UN and the IAEA, to give an objective assessment of irresponsible actions that threaten peace and security.’ This is exactly what the UN did with regard to Russia: the Security Council, the General Assembly, the International Court of Justice, and the International Criminal Court all gave their assessments. And this assessment was unequivocal. Russia recognised it as illegal and blocked it in the UN Security Council with its own veto.
There is no legal, logical or moral difference between what Russia condemns in others and what it itself is doing to Ukraine. There is only one difference — geopolitical: Iran is Moscow’s ally, Ukraine is not. And it is this, not any legal principle, that determines the Kremlin’s position.
THE EMPIRE DOES NOT ABANDON ITS STANDARDS — IT APPROPRIATES THEM
Russia’s double standards regarding Ukraine and Iran are not accidental inconsistency or diplomatic error. They are a systematic strategy of a post-imperial state that refuses to acknowledge the end of its empire.
The ‘Russian world’ is not a cultural concept, but an ideology that legitimises the absorption of neighbours. It divides nations into ‘truly sovereign’ ones — those whose sovereignty Moscow recognises because they are outside its ‘natural sphere of influence’ — — and ‘conditionally sovereign’ — those who, according to the Kremlin, belong to the ‘Russian civilisational space’ and therefore cannot have full sovereignty without Moscow’s sanction.
That is why Russia defends Iran’s sovereignty and denies Ukraine’s sovereignty. That is why it appeals to international law when it is convenient and ignores it when it gets in the way. That is why in the Foreign Ministry’s statements on Iran, we see language that Moscow has never used to describe its own actions in Ukraine.
However, this rhetorical game no longer works as it used to. Four years of full-scale war against Ukraine have made a simple truth clear to the whole world: a state that violates its neighbour’s sovereignty on a daily basis has no moral right to defend the sovereignty of its ally. Words without action are not diplomacy. They are a mask. And that mask has long since fallen.
